Professor Campbell performed a signal service by pointing out that analyses of economic performance under Republican and Democratic presidents must control for the ups and downs of the business cycle that are beyond a president's control. He correctly noted in particular that Republican and Democratic presidents of the postwar era took office under very different economic conditions (Campbell 2011, 15-20) . We strongly concurred with these contentions (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 41-45) .
Unfortunately, Campbell rejects all means of controlling for those ups and downs that do not involve the use of a dependent variable lagged one or two quarters-a flawed practice for two reasons. The first flaw is that if a variable and its lagged value are closely related, one runs the risk of controlling for the dependent variable itself. The second difficulty is that controlling for the dependent variable lagged one quarter controls by extension for the factors that determined that dependent variable up to just three months ago. For these reasons, "lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables" (Achen 2001, 1) .
Campbell seeks to avoid the first of these dangers by claiming that economic variables and their lagged values are related to one another but not really related. On the one hand, Campbell writes-correctly-that "economic conditions are not neatly packaged into quarters. Since the economy is continuously in motion, the condition of the economy at time t should be expected to have an effect on the economy at time t+1" (Campbell 2012, 813 ). Yet Campbell also maintains that economic conditions in adjoining quarters are really not all that related "since the lagged measure is arrived at independently and is of economic activity over a nonoverlapping and significantly long period of time" (Campbell 2012, note 3; see also Campbell 2011, 11) .
Campbell cannot have it both ways. As we noted previously, the fact is that economic conditions in quarters t and t+1 are not independent of each other (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 45 ). If they were, then by the terms of his own argument Campbell would have no need to control for conditions in the preceding quarter. Campbell seeks to escape this dilemma by claiming that "the dependent economic variable and the lagged economy . . . are analytically independent of each other, but they are empirically related to one another" (emphasis in the original; Campbell 2012, note 6). This distinction strikes us as fanciful. They are analytically related for the reasons Campbell explains so well, and his statistical results demonstrate that they are also empirically related.
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The second way a lagged dependent variable "can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables" (Achen 2001, 1) 
. (5) where c is some constant. When n becomes sufficiently large, .37 n and .37 (n-1) approach zero, and Equation (5) 
Subtracting Equation (7) from Equation (6) 
Hence Campbell's Model 2 can be reduced to the form of his Model 1. One cannot simultaneously argue, as Campbell does, for his Model 2 but against his Model 1. And why should anyone estimate these equivalent models in the form of his Model 2, which includes a lagged dependent variable that merely disguises the dependence ofŶ t ( ) on D, the party of the president?
The second of Professor Campbell's objections we consider concerns the alleged dependence of our findings on a few observations. He writes in his footnote 2:
This apparent party difference [in economic performance] is also quite fragile. It is very sensitive to a few cases. Its estimated effect fails to reach conventional significance levels (p < .05, one-tailed) when only two of the 256 quarters are set aside. The economy in the first three quarters of 1950 under Truman during the Korean War grew at rates of between 13 and 17%. Median growth across the series is about three percent. Even without controls for the lagged economy, party differences fail to reach conventional significance levels when just two of these three quarters are excluded. (Campbell 2012) Our check of robustness does not agree with Campbell's. Because we used a Yule-Walker autoregressive procedure, we could not simply delete two or three observations from the data set; instead we reestimated the models in our Tables 6 and 7 for Tables 1 and 2 below,  which parallel Tables 6 and 7 in our article (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 51-52) .
With one exception, the results are similar to those in our article. As before, the Democratic PRESIDENT variable is significant at the .05 level in Models 1, 2, and 5, where the dependent variables are the percentage growth of real GDP, the percentage growth of real disposable personal income per capita, and the unemployment rate. In Model 4, where the dependent variable is the level of real disposable personal income per capita, the Democratic PRESIDENT variable is insignificant, as it was before. The lone difference between these results and our previous findings is that in Model 3, where the dependent variable is the level of real GDP, the Democratic PRESIDENT variable is now statistically insignificant. But that variable is still significant in the models for overall economic growth and unemployment (Models 1 and 5).
Deletion of those three exuberant quarters reduces the estimated impact of a Democratic presidency on the annual real GDP growth rate from the additional 1.04% we reported earlier to an additional .82% here. But the .22 difference is well within our original estimated standard error of .38 (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 51) . And with the unemployment rate as the dependent variable, the coefficient on PRESIDENT changes only slightly, from -1.43 percentage points in our original estimate to -1.35 percentage points here (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 52) . Overall, then, deletion of those three extraordinary quarters does not change the estimated impact of a Democratic presidency by much. The third of Professor Campbell's objections is that our variable for party of the president assigns partial responsibility for the economy as soon as a president's first year in office. We believe that our variable has three advantages over those used by Campbell (2011 Campbell ( , 2012 and Bartels (2008) . First, it phases in a new president's responsibility gradually, unlike the dummy variables used by Campbell and Bartels. As Campbell himself has written, "there is some period in which the effects of a current president considerably overlap with those of his predecessor" (2011, 4) . If one assumes, as we do, that presidents generally bear little responsibility for the economy in their first year in office but considerable responsibility thereafter, the period, say, from mid-1953 to mid-1954 belongs half to Democrat Harry Truman and half to Republican Dwight Eisenhower. And that is how we specified it. A second feature of our variable for partisan control is that, as Campbell acknowledges (2012), our variable does not assign full economic responsibility to a new president until the fourth quarter of his second year, and in this respect actually provides a new president a longer period of at least partial absolution from responsibility than Campbell and Bartels do. (Their variables assign full responsibility to a new president after one year in office.) Finally, as we have written (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 47-48) , this longer lag for attribution of full responsibility for the economy is more consistent with the history of policy actions the postwar presidents took early in their terms and with the economic literature on the lag between enactment of economic policies and their eventual effects on the economy.
In any event, our specification of the presidential party variable did not produce our results, which were virtually identical to those of Bartels (2008) , who specified his presidential variable as Campbell did, and similar to the results of all other studies of this topic other than Campbell's (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Hibbs 1977 Hibbs , 1987 . Professor Campbell's penultimate objection is that in comparing economic growth in Republican presidents' second terms to other years, which we found to be unfavorable to Republican presidents, we chose the wrong years for comparison. He finds that counting the last two years of Republican presidents' first terms as Republican secondterm years produces an average rate of economic growth in these redefined Republican "second terms" that is equivalent to other years.
2 But this reworked result may be an artifact of the variable Campbell has chosen to compare (we compared both economic growth and unemployment in Republican second terms to other years) and the way Campbell has readjusted the years for comparison. As our Table 3 demonstrates, the Republican third and fourth years Campbell adds to his redefined second terms are precisely the years in which Republican presidents did relatively well on the growth measure (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 49) .
Finally, we stand by our contention that we did not induce autocorrelation in the data we analyze in our original Table 6 and in our Table 1 above, and we note that we did correct for the autocorrelation we encountered in the data (Comiskey and Marsh 2012, 46, 50-55) .
